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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Steven Bowman appeals, contending that the district court erred when it denied
his motion to suppress the evidence found in his case. To that point, he makes several
specific assignments of error.
First, he contends that the officers performed an unlawful pat down search of his
person, since they did not have reasonable suspicion that he was armed and presently
dangerous when they conducted that search. As such, he contends that a scale found
during that search, as well as the evidence ultimately found as a result of a search of
that

(i.e., the methamphetamine giving rise to the charge to which Mr. Bowman

pied guilty in this case) should be suppressed.
Second, he contends that whatever, if any, reasonable suspicion arose from that
initial pat down search evaporated when that pat down did not reveal any contraband
(the scale was not immediately evident as contraband, since officers returned it to
Mr. Bowman's possession after seeing what it was) and when a drug dog sniffing his
vehicle did not alert on the vehicle.

As a result, he contends that when the officers

subsequently seized his scale to examine it, that seizure occurred without any
reasonable suspicion. Therefore, he asserts that the seizure of his scale was unlawful.
Third, Mr. Bowman contends that, because the officers had completed the
purpose of the stop when they gave him the citation for the underlying traffic stop during
the dog sniff, the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop by continuing the dog sniff and
by continuing to question him and to seize his property (specifically, the scale) after the
dog sniff of his car ended without an alert. Therefore, he asserts that the seizure of the
scale was unlawful.
1

Finally, he contends that any consent he might have given in regard to the
searches following the dog sniff of his car was not voluntary, but rather, acquiescence to
the officers overbearing his will.

Therefore, he asserts that acquiescence does not

justify those warrantless searches of his person and property.
For any and all of those reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's
order denying Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress and remand this case for further
proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Around midnight on February 1, 2013, Officers David Jones and Tad Miller were
working a routine patrol when they ran the registration on a vehicle driving past, found it
to be cancelled, and initiated a traffic stop. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.1 - p.9, L.11.) 1 The vehicle
in question, which had been registered to Mr. Bowman, pulled into a nearby hotel
parking lot. (Tr., Vol.1, p.9, Ls.8-22.) The vehicle had two occupants, and the officers
each approached one side of the car. 2 Officer Jones approached the passenger, who
turned out to be Mr. Bowman, and noticed that Mr. Bowman as not wearing a seat belt.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.7-11.)

Officer Jones and Officer Miller both noticed that

Mr. Bowman appeared exceedingly nervous. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.15, Ls.17-21.) For

1

The transcripts in this case are provided in three separately bound and paginated
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts
from the hearings on Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress held on September 20, 2013,
and October 4, 2013. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the
pretrial conference hearing held on October 17, 2013. "Vol.3" will refer to the volume
containing the transcripts of the October 29, 2013, change of plea hearing and the
December 12, 2013, sentencing hearing.
2 The officers were each wearing audio devices. Recordings from those devices were
admitted as exhibits during the hearings on the motion to suppress. If possible,
references to those recordings will identify the relevant period of the recording.
2

Mr. Bowman kept picking up and
Officer Jones thought was not normal. 3 (Tr., Vol.1,
However, despite Officer Jones having to

documents in a manner that
1

Ls.8-1

)

Mr. Bowman on several occasions

to quit reaching around in the car, Mr. Bowman was cooperative in answering Officer
Jones' questions. (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.18-25.) For example, Mr. Bowman truthfully told
Officer Jones that he had a prior record consisting of drug charges and illegal
possession of a weapon.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.16, Ls.2-13.)

Nevertheless, Officer Miller

decided, based only on the fact that Mr. Bowman was showing signs of nervousness, to
call for a canine unit to come to the scene. (Tr., Vol.1, p.88, Ls.15-23.)
Meanwhile, Officer Jones checked the identifications of both Mr. Bowman and
the driver (Mr. Bowman's girlfriend, Kayla Martinez).

(Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.20-25.)

Mr. Bowman's license was valid and there were not any warrants for his arrest. (See
Tr., Vol.1, p.19, Ls.7-12.) On the other hand, Ms. Martinez not only had a suspended
license, but a warrant for her arrest as well. (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.16-19; Tr., Vol.1, p.19,
Ls.7-12.) As a result, the officers placed Ms. Martinez under arrest and put her in their
police vehicle. (Tr., Vol.1, p.19, Ls.17-22.) Officer Jones intended to write Mr. Bowman
a ticket for failure to wear a safety belt. 4 (Tr., Vol.1, p.20, Ls.1-10.) However, as a

When Officer Jones had informed Mr. Bowman that the registration on the car had
been cancelled, Mr. Bowman replied that he knew his insurance was bad, but that he
did not realize his registration was bad as well. (Exhibit 1, approximately 1:20.) As
such, it appears the documents Mr. Bowman was looking at were his registration
papers.
4 There was some discussion about whether the officers would also give Mr. Bowman a
citation for no registration and no insurance. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.20, Ls.7-10.) The
audio recordings indicate that the officers decided to be lenient with Mr. Bowman. (See
Exhibit 1, approximately 7:10 (Officer Jones telling Mr. Bowman, 'We want to try not to
write you guys every ticket in the book"); Exhibit 2, approximately 13:00 (Officer Jones
telling Mr. Bowman, "I'm going to give you some breaks. I'm going to write you a seat
belt ticket though, okay?").) The only ticket that was ultimately written for Mr. Bowman
wasforfailuretoweara safety belt. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.97, Ls.18-21.)
3

3

result of the lack of registration, Officer Jones was not going to let Mr. Bowman drive the
car from the scene.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.20, Ls.20-22.)

In fact, all Officer Jones told

Mr. Bowman, when Mr. Bowman asked if he was free to leave, was "we will have to
work through that." (Tr., Vol.1, p.39, L.19 - p.40, L.4.)
During this time, two other officers arrived in the parking lot to deal with an
unrelated issue.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.89, L.21 - p.90, L.8.)

However, Officer Miller was

planning to enlist their aid in dealing with Mr. Bowman and Ms. Martinez; specifically,
the "plan was to have [Mr. Bowman and Ms. Martinez] transported separately to the jail.
Have the girlfriend in one car and then Mr. Bowman in another vehicle." 5 (Tr., Vol.1,
p.90, Ls.11-17.) Officer Steve Bonas also arrived with his drug dog Ruwa during this
time. 6 According to Officer Bonas, Ruwa is trained to detect narcotics and apprehend
fleeing persons.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.108, Ls.20-23.)

To avoid a potential confrontation

between Mr. Bowman and Ruwa, Officer Jones asked Mr. Bowman to get out of the car
before Officer Bonas had Ruwa sniff the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.16-23; Tr., Vol.1, p.22,
L.23 - p.23, 2.) When Mr. Bowman got out of the car, Officer Jones asked Mr. Bowman
if he had any weapons on him, and Mr. Bowman stated that he had a pocket knife in his
coat pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.2-6.) Officer Jones located the knife and secured it in
his own pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.9.) He then continued to pat down Mr. Bowman.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.19-23.)
While Officer Jones was conducting this search, Officer Miller asked Mr. Bowman
if he could search the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.74, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Bowman refused to give that

Thus, Officers Jones and Miller would transport either Mr. Bowman or Ms. Martinez in
their car, and the other person would ride with the two other officers. The third car that
ultimately arrived on the scene had the drug dog.
6 In some portions of the record, the dog's name is misspelled as "Ruha."
5

4

(Tr., Vol.1, p.74,
felt an object in

12-13.)

As Officer

Bowman's right

as "a hard object, a large hard object."

continued

down

pocket,

(Tr., Vol.1, p.28, Ls.4-6.)

Mr. Bowman what it was, Mr. Bowman said he was not sure.

When he asked
(Tr., Vol.1, p.28,

Ls.10-13.) Officer Jones asked if he could see the object to make sure it was not a
weapon or a bomb. 7 (Tr., Vol.1, p.28, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Bowman told Officer Jones he
could look at the item. (Tr., Vol.1, p.28, Ls.22-25.) The item turned out to be a scale,
which Officer Jones placed back in Mr. Bowman's pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.30, L.17 - p.31,
L.2.) Officer Jones found nothing else of interest during the pat down search. (See
Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.7-10.)

At that point, Officer Jones went to write the citation for

Mr. Bowman. (Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.16-21.)
Officer Bonas watched the pat down search, and, after it was completed, he
deployed Ruwa on Mr. Bowman's car to sniff for the odor of drugs. (Tr., Vol.1, p.123
L.2 - p.124, L.8.) Ruwa did not alert on Mr. Bowman's car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.124, Ls.16-17.)
As a result, Officer Bonas placed Ruwa back in his patrol vehicle. (Tr., Vol.1, p.124,
Ls.18-21.)

In the meantime, Officer Miller continued to question Mr. Bowman.

(See generally Exhibit 2 (audio recording from Officer Miller's equipment).) He asked
Mr. Bowman what he did with the scale, and Mr. Bowman explained that he used it to
weigh letters so he could attach the appropriate postage. (Tr., Vol.1, p. 76, Ls.13-18.)
Officer Miller then asked if he could see the scale, and Mr. Bowman shook his head,
indicating that he would not consent to Officer Miller taking the scale. (Tr., Vol.1, p.77,
L.22 - p.78, L.3.) According to Officer Miller, Mr. Bowman was not displaying any signs

7

Officer Jones admitted during the hearing on Mr. Bowman's subsequent motion to
suppress that he did not really believe that the object he felt in Mr. Bowman's pocket
might have been a bomb. (Tr., Vol.1, p.46, Ls.20-22.)
5

being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Tr., Vol. 1,
Officer Miller was questioning

Bowman

L.16

100,

was

sniff of the car, Officer Jones returned and gave Mr. Bowman a ticket for not wearing his
safety belt. (Tr., Vol.1, p.97, Ls.18-21.) Officer Miller admitted that, at that point, they
were only keeping Mr. Bowman there until Ruwa finished sniffing the car because they
did not have any reason to arrest Mr. Bowman. (Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.5-14; Tr., Vol.1,
p.100, Ls.14-17.)
After completing the sniff of Mr. Bowman's car and putting Ruwa back in his
vehicle, Officer Bonas returned to where Officer Miller and Mr. Bowman were standing
and informed Officer Miller that Ruwa had not alerted on the car.
19-21.) Officer Bonas then asked to see the scale.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.85,

(Tr., Vol.1, p.127, Ls.22-24.)

Mr. Bowman acquiesced and let Officer Bonas take the scale.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.128,

Ls.1-3.) Officer Bonas walked away from everyone else and looked at the scale with a
flashlight.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.128, Ls.6-9.)

He claimed that he saw several "very small

particles," not even the size of "flakes," on the scale. 8

(Tr., Vol.1, p.129, Ls.14-15.)

Officer Bonas went back to his vehicle, got Ruwa out again, and had Ruwa sniff the
scale.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.130, Ls.13-22.)

This time, Officer Bonas reported that Ruwa

alerted on the scale. (Tr., Vol.1, p.131, Ls.4-8.)
In the meantime, Officer Miller continued to talk with Mr. Bowman.

That

conversation became more confrontational than it had originally been. (See Exhibit 2,
approximately 13:40-16: 10.) Officer Miller said that Mr. Bowman was still acting
nervous, continuing to move his hands toward his pockets. (Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.24-25.)

8

Defense counsel represented that the scale was subsequently tested at the state
crime laboratory, and the results were negative for controlled substances. (R., p.127.)
6

As a result, Officer Miller decided to perform another pat down search of Mr. Bowman.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.98, L.18 - p.99, L.5.) All Officer Miller found was some chap stick and
some cigarettes. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.99, Ls.6-10.) However, when Officer Bonas told the
other officers that Ruwa had alerted on the scale, they placed Mr. Bowman under arrest
for possession of drug paraphernalia. (Tr., Vol.1, p.79, Ls.16-24.) They proceeded to
search the car and found additional evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia under the
passenger seat. (Tr., Vol.1, p.81, Ls.15-21.)
Mr. Bowman was ultimately charged with possession of methamphetamine and
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.34-35.) The State also filed a
persistent violator enhancement.
suppress the evidence found.

(R., pp.43-44.)
(R., p.73.)

Mr. Bowman filed a motion to

The district court denied that motion,

considering the various challenges Mr. Bowman had made.

First, the district court

found that Officer Jones had reasonable suspicion to pat down Mr. Bowman based on
his excessively nervous behavior, his disclosed criminal history, and his admitted
possession of a knife. (R., pp.141-42.)
Second, the district court determined that Mr. Bowman's consent to allow Officer
Jones to look at the unknown object in his pocket (the scale) was voluntary.
(R., pp.142-44.) In that regard, it noted that the ratio of officers (three plus the dog) to
suspects (two) was not unusual given the time and location of the stop, the tone of the
conversation was mostly conversational and polite but had authoritative overtones,
Mr. Bowman was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and Mr. Bowman knew of
his right to refuse consent. 9 (R., pp.142-43.) Third, the district court also decided that,

The district court noted that Mr. Bowman evidenced his knowledge of the right to
refuse consent by refusing to allow Officer Miller to search the car right before Officer
Jones asked to look at the item in his pocket. (R., p.143.)
9

7

although

r.

was not
to

raised, the same finding of voluntariness applied
Officer Bonas

the scale. 10

, p.144.)

Fourth, the district court found that Ruwa's alert on the scale gave officers
probable cause to search the car, and that they could also search it incident to
Mr. Bowman's arrest. (R., p.144.) The district court also stated that it was considering
Mr. Bowman's refusal to consent in its determination that there was probable cause to
search the car. (R., p.144.) Finally, it concluded that the officers had not unreasonably
prolonged the stop because, once the officers found the scale, the nature of the stop
changed and they could investigate for potential drug-related crimes.

(R., p.146.)

Therefore, the district court concluded that the order of Officer Bonas' actions
(deploying Ruwa on Mr. Bowman's car and his seizure and subsequent examination of
the scale) was irrelevant because they were part of the same justified investigation.
(R., p.147.) The district court made no findings on whether the reasonable suspicion
evaporated when Ruwa did not alert on the car.

(See generally R.; see R., p.130

(Mr. Bowman raising the issue of dispelled reasonable suspicion in regard to his
challenge that the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop).)
Mr. Bowman ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to a plea
agreement. He reserved his right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.5, Ls.17-19.) He also agreed to enter an Alford plea to possession of
methamphetamine. 11 (Tr., Vol.3, L.13.) The State agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia
charge and the persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., Vol.3, p.5, Ls.14-15.) The district

10

Since the district court ruled on this issue, it may be raised on appeal. State v.
DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998).
11 Pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), a defendant may enter a
guilty plea while maintaining his factual innocence.
8

court imposed and executed a unified sentence of seven years, with two and one-half
years fixed.

(R., pp.157-59.)

Mr. Bowman filed a timely notice of appeal from the

judgment of conviction. (R., pp.164-66.)

9

ISSUE
Whether

district court

by denying Mr.

10

motion

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress

A

Introduction
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 'The right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend
IV. The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. .Johnson, 110 Idaho
516,

(1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against

unreasonable

and seizures. IDAH0 CONST. Art. I,§ ·1?; State v. Donato, 1

Idaho 469,471 (2001 ).
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the State
demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated
exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts. Id. at 390-91; see also State v.
Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to Art. I,§ 17

of the Idaho Constitution).
There are several reasons why the searches of Mr. Bowman in this case were
unlawful. Officer Jones' initial pat down of Mr. Bowman, which led to the discovery of
the scale in the first place, was unlawful because there was no evidence that
Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous.

Additionally, since Officer Jones

returned the scale to Mr. Bowman (evidencing that it did not appear to be contraband)
and because Ruwa did not alert on the car, whatever reasonable suspicion the officers
11

may have had from Officer Jones' search dissipated.

Furthermore, because Officer

Jones had completed the purpose of the stop during Ruwa's sniff of the car, the officers
unlawfully prolonged the stop by having Ruwa continue to sniff the car.

They also

unlawfully prolonged the stop by continuing to detain Mr. Bowman after Ruwa finished
sniffing tt1e car because any reasonable suspicion that the officers may have had
dissipated when Ruwa did not alert on the car.
Also, when Officer Bonas asked Mr. Bowman to let him see the scale during the
portion of the detention that was unlawfully prolonged, the totality of the circumstances
demonstrate that Mr. Bowman's purported consent was not voluntary.

Rather, he

acquiesced to the continuing pressure of the officers during the unlawfully-prolonged
detention.

In the absence of voluntary consent, Officer Bonas did not have an

independent justification to search Mr. Bowman, particularly since Officer Jones had
already performed a pat down search on Mr. Bowman and Ruwa did not alert on
Mr. Bowman's car. For any and all of these reasons, the scale should be suppressed,
as well as all the evidence found as a result of seizing that scale, as that evidence was
fruit of the poisonous tree.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88

(1963) (explaining that evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree if the officers found that
evidence by exploiting information or evidence found illegally); State v. Bainbridge, 117
Idaho 245, 249 (1990) (same). Officer Bonas' search of the scale gave the officers the
justification to search Mr. Bowman's car, and since the search of the scale was
unlawful, the evidence found in the car was fruit of the poisonous tree.

12

B.

Neither Officer Jones Nor Officer Bonas Had A Reasonable Suspicion That
Mr. Bowman Was Armed And Presently Dangerous, And So, Their Searches Of
Him Were Unlawful
Officer Jones' initial pat down of Mr. Bowman and Officer Bonas'

Mr. Bowman's pocket to seize the

of

could only be justified under the exception to

the warrant requirement identified in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 12

In Terry, the

United States Supreme Court held that officers may conduct pat down searches of the
outer layer of a person's clothing for weapons, provided they have a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, because those searches serve to protect the safety of the
officer and others in the area. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). However, when there
is not a reasonable suspicion that the person poses a present threat to the safety of the
officers or others nearby, this exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable:
The primary concern of the Supreme Court in Terry and its
progeny . . . was to protect the safety of officers and others from harm
when dealing with a person who may pose a risk. As the Terry court put
it, "where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel [the
officer's] reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons that might be used to assault him."
Our inquiry then is to determine whether it was objectively
reasonable for [the officer] to conclude a pat down search was necessary
for the protection of himself or others.
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 661 (2007) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30) (emphasis

added).

The officers did not have had the requisite reasonable suspicion that

Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous when they conducted their respective
searches. Therefore, because either or both of those searches were unlawful, the scale

12

Absent valid consent, the only way for Officer Bonas to have got hold of the scale was
to search Mr. Bowman's pocket. As will be discussed in depth in Section D, infra,
Mr. Bowman did not give valid consent to Officer Bonas.
13

discovered and subsequently seized as a result of those searches should have been
suppressed.

1.

Officer Jones' Pat Down Of Mr. Bowman Was Unlawful

Officer Jones' initial pat down of Mr. Bowman was not justified because he did
not have a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous.
The fact that a person has told an officer that he is in possession of a knife does not
necessarily give the officer justification to conduct a pat down search, since such a
statement does not, by itself demonstrate that the person poses a present risk to officer
safety. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,819 (2009). 13 .
In fact, this case is very similar to the situation addressed by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Henage. In that case, officers initiated a traffic stop of the car being driven by
Mr. Henage and his brother. Henage, 143 Idaho at 657. Officers told Mr. Henage that
he was not under arrest, but they wanted to still ask him some questions. Id. at 657-58.
Mr. Henage was "nervous, but he was real cooperative and he was polite," as he
answered the officers' questions. Id. at 658. When officers asked for his permission to
search the car, he refused to give his consent. Id. Officers then asked if he had any
contraband on him, and Mr. Henage replied that he had a knife. Id. One of the officers
performed a pat down search to locate the knife. Id. The officer located the knife, put it
back in Mr. Henage's pocket, and continued the search. Id.
During that continuation of the search, the officer "felt a large hard object in one
of [Mr. Henage's] cargo pockets." Id. When asked, Mr. Henage said he did not know

13

This holding from Bishop was also previously articulated in two separate concurring
opinions in Henange authored by Chief Justice Schroeder and Justice Eismann.
Henage, 143 Idaho at 663.
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what it was. Id. The officer reached into the pocket and removed a glass pipe and a
cigar tube, which was determined to contain methamphetamine.

Id.

The Idaho

Supreme Court concluded that there was no evidence that Mr. Henage was armed and
presently dangerous after the officer located the knife and returned it to Mr. Henage's
pocket. Id. at 661-62. Therefore, the evidence found in Mr. Henage's pocket during
that unlawful pat down had to be suppressed. Id. at 663. The Court of Appeals has
since held that, once officers assure themselves that an item found during a Terry
search does not pose a threat to their safety, they are not justified in further searching
those items. State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730-31 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the
officers had no justification to warrantlessly search a mint tin seized during a Terry
search).
Much like in Henage, officers initiated a traffic stop on Mr. Bowman's vehicle.
Although he appeared nervous, he was cooperative and polite as he answered the
officers' questions. 14

(Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.18-19.)

Mr. Bowman, like Mr. Henage,

14

This is true even though Mr. Bowman did move his hands around (for example,
toward his pockets) during the encounter. (Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.24-25; Tr., Vol.1, p.12,
L.18 - p.13, L.15.) It was, after all, midnight in midwinter. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.1-2.)
The Court of Appeals has considered a similar situation and concluded:
Although Davenport was not completely cooperative, for he kept returning
his hands to his pockets, the tenor of the conversation between Davenport
and the officer was casual and calm. Davenport exhibited no aggression
nor antagonism toward the officer, and placing hands in pockets is not
unusual .... We conclude that on the facts presented here, where there
was no furtive or aggressive behavior or suspicious circumstances,
Davenport's act of returning his hands to his pockets on a cold night
despite the officer's contrary instruction did not create reasonable
suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.
Davenport, 144 Idaho at 103. Here, as in Davenport, the tenor of the conversation was
mostly casual and calm, and Mr. Bowman displayed no antagonism toward the officers.
(R., p.143) He simply kept moving his hands toward his pockets, which was not
unreasonable, as it was midnight in midwinter. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.1-2.) His other
15

refused to give consent to search his car.

(Tr., VoL1, p.74, Ls.9-·13.)

He also, like

Mr. Henage, told officers that he was carrying a knife. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.2-6.) Officer
Jones performed a search of Mr. Bowman to locate the knife and removed it from his
control. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.9.) As such, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate
that Mr. Bowman did not preset a threat to the officers' safety, even though he had a
knife in his pocket.
The only other factors which the district court relied on in its determination that
Officer Jones' search was justified were Mr. Bowman's past record and nervous
behavior.

However, neither of those facts actually created a reasonable suspicion

that Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous.

For example, the fact that

Mr. Bowman had, at one point in the past, possessed a weapon illegally, does not
indicate that he was armed and presently dangerous.

This is particularly true here,

since the facts show that the conversation between Mr. Bowman and Officer Jones was
calm and cooperative. In that same regard, the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out
that the fact that a person appears nervous does not, by itself, justify the conclusion that
he is armed and presently dangerous, particularly when the officer does not connect
that "'nervousness with anything tending to demonstrate a risk to [the officer's] safety."'
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819 (quoting Henage, 143 Idaho at 662-63); State v. Davenport,
144 Idaho 99, 103 (Ct. App. 2007). Here, as in Bishop, the officers simply testified that
Mr. Bowman was nervous, perhaps excessively so, but they did not connect that
nervousness to any specific facts suggesting that there was a risk that their safety was

movements while he was inside the car also did not indicate furtive or aggressive
behavior, as Mr. Bowman simply kept looking at documents (likely, his registration
papers). (See Tr., Vol.1, pp13, Ls.8-15.) Therefore, that behavior did not give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous.
16

compromised. (See generally R.) Therefore, the evidence did not demonstrate that
Officer Jones had a reasonable suspicion that would justify his warrantless search of
Mr. Bowman.
Therefore, as in Henage, there was no reasonable suspicion for Officer Jones to
continue searching Mr. Bowman, and so, the scale found in his pocket during that
unlawful search should have been suppressed.

2.

Officer Bonas' Search Of Mr. Bowman And Seizure Of The Scale Was
Unlawful Absent Valid Consent

In regard to Officer Bonas' further search and seizure of the scale, he had even
less reasonable suspicion to search Mr. Bowman under Terry that Officer Jones did.
Officer Bonas watched Officer Jones' search of Mr. Bowman before deploying Ruwa.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.2-12.)

As such, he saw that Officer Jones had taken

Mr. Bowman's knife and had found no other weapons or obvious contraband. 15
(Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.7-10.)

Therefore, Officer Bonas had no reasonable belief that

Mr. Bowman was either armed or presently dangerous. As such, Officer Bonas had no
independent justification to search Mr. Bowman or seize the scale in his pocket.
Therefore, the evidence flowing from that unlawful conduct should be suppressed.
Compare Henage, 143 Idaho at 662-63.

15

As Officer Jones admitted, even though he had told Mr. Bowman that the item in
Mr. Bowman's pocket could be a bomb, he never really suspected that it was a bomb.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.46, Ls.20-22.) That admission suggests that a reasonable person feeling
the object in Mr. Bowman's pocket would not have reasonably suspected it to be a
weapon, and thus, would not have reasonably believed the officers' safety was
compromised by that object. Additionally, the fact that he returned it to Mr. Bowman's
possession when Mr. Bowman was not otherwise restrained evidenced that there was
nothing inherently suspicious about the scale.

17

Additionally, even if Officer

justified in

he had no justification to

ing Mr.

since it was evident without that

seizure that the scale did not present a threat to his safety. Compare Faith, 141 Idaho
at 730-31. In Faith, the officers conducted a Terry search on Mr. Faith and felt an object
in his pocket which was not immediately identifiable, but did not feel like a weapon. Id.
at 729. An officer removed the object from Mr. Faith's pocket; it was an Altoids-brand
mint tin. Id. The officer testified that, in his experience, such containers can be used to
transport drugs.

Id.

Therefore, one of the officers opened the tin and found

methamphetamine. Id. The Court of Appeals held that, once the officers had confirmed
that the item was not a weapon, and therefore, not a threat to their

they had no

justification to continue to search the item. Faith, 141 Idaho at 730-31.
Applying that rule in this case, the fact that the officers had seen the scale did not
justify Officer Bonas' warrantless search of Mr. Bowman to seize the scale. This is true
even though Officer Jones testified that a scale can be used in relation to illicit activities.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.30, Ls.17-24.) Officer Jones had obviously already concluded that the
scale did not pose a threat to the officers' safety, since he gave it back to Mr. Bowman.
Compare Henage, 143 Idaho at 662 ("Add this to the fact that [the officer] actually
returned the Leatherman to [Mr. Henage], and we simply cannot say that the totality of

the circumstances creates a reasonable inference that [Mr. Henage] posed a risk to the
safety of [the officer] or others.") (emphasis in original).

Therefore, Officer Bonas'

search of Mr. Bowman was unlawful, as was the seizure of the scale.
In fact, that conclusion is particularly appropriate here, since the Court of Appeals
has also recognized that, when the items purportedly giving rise to reasonable suspicion
are non-criminal in nature, "although they could be viewed in a suspicious light, (they]
18

do not support a commonsense evaluation that there was a fair probability that
contraband existed in the [area to be searched]." State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915
(Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the
district court's conclusion that Officer Bonas could validly search the scale as part of this
expanded investigation absent valid consent should be rejected as erroneous

C.

The Officers Unreasonably Prolonged The Stop
The district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress is also erroneous

because the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop.

Traffic stops are limited in

scope, and in that regard, are analogous to investigative detentions. State v. Danney,
153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012). As such, they are limited by the principles set forth in Terry.
Id.

Such detentions '"must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop."' Id. (quoting Henage, 143 Idaho at 658 (quoting
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983))). For example, if the officers abandon the

purpose of the stop to allow for a drug dog search, that extension "must be justified by a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Id.
The violation of Mr. Bowman's rights in this regard is plainly evident in this case.
Officer Miller testified that Officer Jones wrote a ticket for Mr. Bowman, and at that point,
they had no reason to continue to detain Mr. Bowman. (Tr., Vol.1, p.97, L.18 - p.98,
L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.14-17.) However, they continued to hold him "Until [Officer
Bonas] finished his job."

(Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.5-6.)

Therefore, the facts clearly

demonstrate that the officers prolonged the stop to continue to allow the drug dog to
continue to sniff Mr. Bowman's car. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has made it
abundantly clear that such behavior violates the Fourth Amendment: "A drug dog sniff
is not a search and may be done during an investigative stop, but the use of the drug
19

dog may not lengthen the duration of the stop." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8

(Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). Since the officers admitted that they had no reason
to continue to detain Mr. Bowman, but did so to allow Ruwa to continue sniffing the car,
the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop, and all the evidence found thereafter should
be suppressed.
The conclusion that the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop in this case is also
obvious if, as discussed in Section 8(1 ), supra, Officer Jones' initial pat down of
Mr. Bowman was unlawful.

The district court determined that the nature of the

investigation changed once Officer Jones found the scale.

(R., p.146.) However, if

Officer Jones unlawfully discovered the scale, prolonging the stop based on that scale
exploited the illegal search which discovered the scale, and thus, all the evidence found
thereafter has to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
487-88; Bainbridge, 117 Idaho at 249. As a result, the officers' continued detention of
Mr. Bowman after the purpose of the stop was complete (when they gave him the seat
belt citation) was improper and violated Mr. Bowman's constitutional rights.
Furthermore, even if the district court was correct, and the officers were justified
in expanding the scope of their search once they found the scale in Mr. Bowman's
pocket, whatever reasonable suspicion that discovery generated dissipated when the
pat down search of Mr. Bowman and the dog sniff of the car revealed no other evidence
of criminal activity. After all, the intrusion on a person's constitutional rights during a
detention "should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361
(Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 500) (emphasis added).

In fact, Officer

Miller's admission that the officers did not have any reasonable suspicion to continue
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detaining Mr. Bowman after Officer Jones wrote the seat belt ticket, which occurred
while Ruwa was still sniffing the car, demonstrates that the fact that Mr. Bowman had a
scale did not create any suspicion in their minds, particularly since Officer Jones gave
the scale back to Mr. Bomwan. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.97, L.18 - p.98, L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.100,
Ls.14-17.) Since the suspicion had been dispelled once Ruwa finished sniffing the car,
the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop by continuing to detain, question, and search
Mr. Bowman.
It is important to note here that the district court considered an inappropriate

factor in its reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations - the fact that

Mr. Bowman had invoked his right to refuse to consent to a search. The district court
explained, "nothing in our law requires a police officer assessing the existence of
probable cause to disregard a suspect's refusal to consent to such a search as one of
the factors supporting the determination that probable cause exists." 16 (R., p.144 n.1.)
Considering Mr. Bowman's invocation of his constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable, warrantless searches in any reasonable suspicion or probable cause
determination is wholly inappropriate. "[A] refusal of consent can play no role in the
reasonable suspicion calculus." United States v. $85,688.00 in United States Currency,
_

Fed.Appx. _ , 2014 WL 4237377, *5 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (emphasis in

original). 17 "Any other rule would make a mockery of the reasonable suspicion and

16

While the district court only specifically mentioned this factor in determining whether
the officers had probable cause to search the car after Ruwa alerted on the scale, its
explanation of why it was considering that factor - that nothing requires an officer to
disregard a refusal to give consent - applies to all the challenged searches, since
Mr. Bowman refused to give consent when Officer Miller asked to search the car even
before Officer Jones' initial pat down search of Mr. Bowman.
17 Although unpublished decisions are not precedential, the Tenth Circuit rules allow
unpublished decisions to be cited for persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (a).
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probable cause requirements, as well as the
would be considerably less

if citizens'

doctrine.
that

principles
and

conducted in conformity with constitutional norms could create the suspicion or cause
that renders their consent unnecessary." United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345
(10th Cir. 1998). Therefore, as the Arizona Court of Appeals effectively summarized:
the invocation of one's constitutional rights cannot constitute a
circumstance that gives rise to reasonable suspicion. If the mere refusal of
consent itself constituted reasonable suspicion, nothing would prevent
warrantless searches of random individuals, because either the grant or
refusal of consent would eventually justify the searches. We conclude
that the Fourth Amendment would be rendered largely meaningless by
placing every person in such a Catch-22. "[W]e believe that a defendant's
invocation of constitutional rights is probative of no thin~ [sic] except the
defendant's awareness of his or her constitutional rights." 8

State v. Sweeney, 227 P.3d 868, 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Palenkas,
933 P.2d 1269, 1280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)). The fact that the district court was willing to
inappropriately consider this factor at any point in its analysis gives rise to a concern
that it considered that same factor at every turn.

As such, the district court's

determination that there was reasonable suspicion is irretrievably tainted by its improper
consideration of his invocation of his constitutional rights, and so, should be rejected by
this Court.

Several other courts, both state and federal, have similarly concluded that considering
a defendant's invocation of his constitutional rights in a reasonable suspicion or
probable cause determination is impermissible. See, e.g., In re H.H., 174 Cal.App.4th
653, 658-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); United States v. Leal, 235 Fed.Appx. 937, 940
(3rd Cir. 2007); United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1110 (11th Cir. 2003);
Garner v. State, 566 S.E.2d 329, 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); United States v. Smith, 263
F.3d 571, 594 (6th Cir. 2001 ); People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666 (Colo. 2001) (en bane)
(abrogated on other grounds by People v. Esparza, 272 P.3d 367 (Colo. 2012)
(en bane)); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 435 n.32 (5th Cir. 2001 );
D.K. v. State, 736 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (abrogated on other grounds by
McLain v. State, 963 N.E.2d 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)); United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d
1095, 1097 (D.C. App. 1993); Gomez v. State, 572 So.2d 952, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
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Considering

appropriate

there was

in this case.

the

to

the Idaho

Court

"an

investigative stop cannot continue beyond the point when reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity evaporate[s]." State v. Allgood, 98 Idaho 525, 529 (1977) (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 17-18). Reasonable suspicion and probable cause are "fluid concept(s]turning

on

the

assessment

of

probabilities

in

particular

factual

contexts."

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Therefore, just as a situation may evolve to
create reasonable suspicion where none was originally evident, a situation may evolve
to dispel any such reasonable suspicion that has already arisen.

For example, the

Ninth Circuit has pointed out that probable cause "may be dissipated if the investigating
officer later learns additional information that decreases the likelihood that the
defendant has engaged, or is engaging in criminal activity," and "[police] may not
disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause." United States v. Ortiz-Herandez,
427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005). "[A]dditional information obtained at the scene may
indicate that there is less than a fair probability that the defendant has committed or is
committing a crime. In such cases, execution of the arrest or continuation of the arrest
is illegal. . . . It will not suffice that at some earlier point in time-before the police
gleaned certain 'dissipating' facts-the police may have had probable cause." United

States v. Lopez, 482 F .3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007).
In this case, two facts became evident that dispelled whatever reasonable
suspicion may have arisen from Officer Jones finding the scale.

First, Officer Jones'

search of Mr. Bowman's person did not uncover any apparent contraband, particularly
since Officer Jones returned the scale to Mr. Bowman's possession. (See Tr., Vol.1,
p.31, Ls.7-10.) Second, and more notably, Ruwa did not alert on the car. (Tr., Vol.1,
23

p:124, Ls.16-17.) In fact, Officer Miller admitted on cross examination that, even before
Ruwa finished sniffing the car, the situation had evolved to the point that the probability
that Mr. Bowman was engaged in criminal activity was reduced so far that the officers
did not have a reason to continue detaining Mr. Bowman.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.5-14;

Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.14-17.) Thus, adding in the fact that Ruwa did not alert on the car
definitely dissipated any lingering suspicion of potential criminal activity.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has considered a similar situation and explained:
"[A] failed drug sniff is exactly the type of evidence that tends to undermine the
conclusion of the presence of drugs. It is a negating factor that has a substantial impact
on

the

determination

of

probable

cause,

and

cannot

be

lightly

ignored."

Longshore v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1156 (Md. 2007). The Idaho Supreme Court has
found that, in the totality of the circumstances of that particular case, probable cause did
not dissipate when, after a positive alert on the exterior of a car, the drug dog did not
alert in the interior of that car. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703 (2012). However, this
case is distinguishable, since there was no positive alert preceding the "no alert." As
the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, when a dog has reliable training, that
"provide[s] sufficient reason to trust his alert," or, as in this case, his non-alert on a car. 19

Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1056-57 (2013) (also recognizing that, "[i]f a dog on
patrol fails to alert to a car containing drugs, the mistake will usually go undetected
because the officer will not initiate a search" in such cases). Therefore, in the totality of
the circumstances of this case, officers no longer had reasonable suspicion that criminal

Officer Bonas testified that he and Ruwa were a certified as a handler team with a
substantial amount of training together at the time of their encounter with Mr. Bowman.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.108, L.4 - p.115, L.6; Exhibit 4 (letter of certification for Officer Bonas and
Ruwa).) Ruwa's reliability was not challenged below. (See generally R.)
19
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activity was afoot when Ruwa did not alert on Mr. Bowman's car; at best, they had a
hunch. As a result, the prolongation of Mr. Bowman's detention was unlawful.
As former Chief Justice Schroeder has observed, "[i]n the aftermath of the reality
of [the person searched] possessing drugs it is tempting to find a rationalization for
justifying the search. However, wrapped around the overlays of Terry interpretation [sic]
is a simple concept of personal privacy and security."

Henage, 143 Idaho at 663

(Schroeder, C.J., specially concurring). Properly applying these rules, at the point that
the purpose of the traffic stop was complete, that person should have been free to go on
about his business like any other citizen. Id. In this case, once the reason for detaining
Mr. Bowman ended (by delivering the citation and by reasonable suspicion dissipating),
the continued detention so officers could continue to intrude on Mr. Bowman's
constitutional right to privacy was unlawful.

D.

Mr. Bowman's Consent To Allow Officer Bonas To See The Scale Was Not
Voluntary
Consent is another exception to the warrant requirement. However, to be valid,

that consent must be voluntary. When consent is given following an unlawful detention,
that consent is invalid because of the taint of the unlawful detention. State v. Gutierrez,
137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002); see also State v. Ba,wick, 94 Idaho 139, 142
(1971) (reaching that same conclusion in regard to an unlawful arrest). Therefore, since
the officers had unlawfully prolonged the stop when Mr. Bowman let Officer Bonas see
the scale (see Section C, supra), that consent was invalidated by the unlawful detention.
Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Mr. Bowman's
consent was not voluntary, and thus, did not justify the warrantless search.

See

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (holding that courts look to the totality of the
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circumstances to determine if consent was voluntary); State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774,
778 (Ct. App. 2006) (same).
intelligent, and voluntary consent.

Mere acquiescence does not constitute knowing,
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548A9

(1986); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98 (Ct App. 2006). There are several factors
which may impact the determination of whether consent was voluntary, or whether it
was coerced by the officers overbearing the defendant's will. 20
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778.

Schneckloth v.

Those factors

include, but are not limited to, the number of officers involved, the location, conditions,
and time at which the consent was given, whether the individual was free to leave, and
whether the individual knew of his right to deny consent are all factors.

Garcia, 143

Idaho at 778.
The totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrate that Mr. Bowman did
not give voluntary consent to allow Officer Bonas to warrantlessly seize the scale and
search it.

Mr. Bowman was stopped at night and ordered out of the car.

See

State v. Guiterrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651 (Ct. App. 2002) ("It is also likely that a person

who has been directed by an officer to exit a vehicle would not believe that the traffic
stop was over until he or she was permitted to return [to the car]."). There were three
officers and one drug dog on scene dealing just with Mr. Bowman (Ms. Martinez had
already been arrested and secured in the back of a patrol vehicle).

20

Officer Jones

While this test is an objective test, it is worth noting that Mr. Bowman did assert in an
affidavit that the officers had overborne his will. Given the developments in the stop,
such as the fact that Ruwa did not alert on the car and the fact that the officers had
already patted him down, the officers' continued questions caused him to feel "that I did
not have a choice but to allow him [Officer Bonas] to take it [the scale] out of my
pocket." (R., pp.111-12.)
26

testified that he, at least, was uniformed and armed. 21 (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.21-25.) There
were also two other officers at the scene dealing with another matter.

Thus, a

reasonable person in Mr. Bowman's position would have seen five uniformed officers
and three police vehicles at the scene, and would have felt less able to continue to
refuse the officers' requests to search him or his property.
That conclusion is more reasonable in this case, since Officer Miller testified that,
during the initial detention of Mr. Bowman, he was planning to involve those other
officers in Mr. Bowman's incident "at the end ... if we needed." (Tr., Vol.1, p.90, Ls.1517.) Specifically, he was planning to have those officers transport either Mr. Bowman or
Ms. Martinez to jail. 22

(Tr., Vol.1, p.90, Ls.11-17.)

The fact that Officer Miller was

already planning on how to effectively transport Mr. Bowman to jail further demonstrates
that Mr. Bowman was never going to be free to leave.

(See also Tr., Vol.1, p.89,

Ls.17-20 (Officer Miller testifying that he did not consider either Mr. Bowman or
Ms. Martinez free to leave during the initial detention).)
Furthermore, Mr. Bowman had also been informed, after the driver of the car had
been arrested, that he would not be allowed to drive the car from the scene because of
the cancelled registration. (Tr., Vol.1, p.20, Ls.20-22.) In fact, in response to his inquiry
about whether he was free to leave at all, Officer Jones only told him they would have to
"work through that." (Tr., Vol.1, p.39, L.19 - p.40, L.4.) Mr. Bowman was never told that
he was or would be free to leave.

21

There was no indication that any of the other officers were not in their regular
uniforms or without their service weapons. (See generally R.)
22 Not only does that indicate that the situation was more coercive regarding
Mr. Bowman's acquiescence to Officer Bonas, but it also demonstrates that the Officer
Miller, at least had abandoned the purpose the stop, and thus, prolonged the detention
beyond what was permissible (see Section C, supra).
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Additionally, when Officer Miller took over questioning Mr. Bowman (while Officer
Jones wrote the citation and Officer Bonas was performing the canine sniff of the car),
his questioning became more confrontational, and it ultimately resulted in Officer Miller
performing yet another pat down search of Mr. Bowman. 23

(See Exhibit 2,

approximately 13:40-16:50.) As the Court of Appeals has recognized, when an officer
continues to question a person without telling him he is free to leave, especially when
he has not been allowed to return to his car, the officer's emergency lights remain
active, and the questioning is not sociable, a reasonable person would not have felt free
to leave. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651.
Furthermore, at the time Officer Bonas requested to see the scale, Mr. Bowman
had been frisked, his car had been sniffed by a drug dog, and he had been provided a
citation by Officer Jones. And yet, despite the fact that the officers had found nothing
during those searches and had completed the purpose of the stop, he was still not being
allowed to leave. Instead, was he was subjected to additional questioning by Officer
Miller (who admitted he never intended to let Mr. Bowman leave at all; he was going to

Officer Miller's pat down search, which began after Officer Bonas had begun
searching the scale but before Ruwa alerted on the scale (see Exhibit 2), was also
unlawful. It was not justified as a Terry stop since Mr. Bowman's knife had been taken
from him and Officer Jones had already searched him for weapons. As such, Officer
Miller could not have harbored a reasonable concern that Mr. Bowman was armed or
presently dangerous. And, while Mr. Bowman did acquiesce to Officer Miller's "request"
to perform that search, that acquiescence was, like the acquiescence to Officer Bonas,
not voluntary.
Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Bowman acquiesced to Officer Miller's request to
conduct this third search of his person reinforces the conclusion that Mr. Bowman had
acquiesced to Officer Bonas' request to seize the scale: when Officer Bonas piled on
the continuing detention after putting Ruwa back in his vehicle, Mr. Bowman gave up
and quit refusing all the requests to search, even though, during the initial portion of the
detention, he had been exercising his rights in that regard.
23

28

find a reason to arrest him). Mr. Bowman also continued to be subjected to requests to
search his person and his property.
All these factors together demonstrate that, despite the fact that Mr. Bowman did
know about his right to refuse consent, Mr. Bowman's consent to allow Officer Bonas to
look at the scale was not voluntary; it was acquiescence to the overbearing nature of
the officers' continued questioning.

This conclusion is particularly clear in this case,

where that additional questioning occurred during the unlawful prolonging of the
detention.
Therefore, for any and all of the foregoing reasons, the scale should have been
suppressed. Since it was only Ruwa's alert on the scale that gave the officers probable
cause to search the car, all the evidence found in the car is fruit of the poisonous tree,
and should be suppressed as well.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Bowman respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress the evidence and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 22 nd day of October, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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